(1) A conjunction is true iff both of its conjuncts are true. are going to be required, as well. But if we add all of the various principles of that sort to PA-that is, if we add a theory of truth of the kind Tarski (1958) showed us how to formulate-then the result is not a conservative extension of PA, since the resulting theory proves that PA is consistent, via the following sort of argument: Every axiom of PA is true; the rules of inference preserve truth; so every theorem of PA is true; but there is at least one sentence that is not true, e.g., 0 = 1, 2 which is therefore not a theorem of PA; so PA is consistent.
Shapiro's version of the conservativeness argument attracted a direct response from Field, who had by then emerged as one of the leaders of the deflationist uprising. Field (1999) notes that, if we only add 'compositional principles' like (1) to PA, then the result is again a conservative extension (Parsons, 1974, pp. 5-7) . It is only if we also extend the induction scheme to permit semantic vocabulary that we get a non-conservative extension (see also Halbach, 2001b) . And so Field writes:
Since truth can be added in ways that produce a conservative extension. . . , there is no need to disagree with Shapiro when he says that "conservativeness is essential to deflationism". . . . Shapiro's position, however, is that a deflationist must hold that adding 'true' to number theory in the full-blooded way that involves [extending the induction axioms also] produces a conservative extension. (Field, 1999, p. 536) Field then goes on to argue that a deflationist need hold no such thing. At most, the deflationist should hold that the principles about truth that 'flow from its disquotational nature' are conservative over number theory; she need not hold that all principles about truth are conservative. But, Field claims, the induction principles flow not from the nature of truth, but from the nature of the natural numbers. They are not semantical but arithmetical in character, so whether adding them yields a conservative extension is irrelevant to the issue at hand.
In what seems to me to be the crucial passage, Field quotes Shapiro (1998, p. 499) as asking: "How thin can the notion of arithmetical truth be if, by invoking it, we can learn more about the natural numbers?" Field then replies:
. . . [T] he way in which we "learn more about the natural numbers by invoking truth" is that in having that notion we can rigorously formulate a more powerful arithmetical theory than we could rigorously formulate before. There is nothing very special about truth here: using any other notion not expressible in the original language we can get new instances of induction, and in many cases these lead to nonconservative extensions. (Field, 1999, p. 536) This is right, so far as it goes, but it is also extremely misleading.
What does Field mean by "using [a] notion not expressible in the original language"? The natural way to read him would be as talking about definability: about what happens if we add a new predicate whose extension is not definable in the original language. In that case, Field would be saying something like this:
If we add a new predicate whose extension is not definable in the original language, then we will get new instances of induction, which may lead to new theorems in the original language.
That is of course right. We will get new instances of induction that may lead to new theorems. But the case of the truth-predicate is precisely not one of those cases. Tarski's Theorem tells us that the set of truths of the language of PA is not definable in the language of arithmetic. But if we add a truth-predicate T(x) to the language of PA and extend PA by adding the T-sentences, then that is enough to guarantee that T(x) defines a set not definable in the original language, namely: the set of true sentences of the language of arithmetic. But the result is still a conservative extension of PA even if we extend induction. It follows that the non-conservativity result is not due just to the presence of "new instances of induction" formulated using a "notion not expressible in the original language". It is also necessary that we have a fully compositional truth-theory, and not just the T-sentences.
So, again: It is only if we both add a compositional truth-theory to PA and extend the induction axioms to permit semantic vocabulary that we get a non-conservative extension. Neither is sufficient by itself. That makes the dialectical situation complicated. Field wants to allow that compositional principles about truth 'flow from truth's disquotational nature' and so should be conservative; 3 he can do so by blaming the nonconservativity result on the extension of induction. Shapiro, by contrast, blames the non-conservativity result on the compositional principles, because he thinks we are independently committed to induction for any well-defined predicate we can understand. Are we, then, at a standoff?
Not necessarily. As we shall see, the situation is not entirely symmetrical. Adding a compositional truth-theory does yield a conservative extension if we do not extend the induction axioms, but the resulting theory is, in most cases, still logically stronger than the original theory. On the other hand, if we just add the T-sentences, then, in almost all cases, the resulting theory is, in a well-defined sense, not logically stronger than the original theory even if we do extend the induction axioms. And that already seems to me to be out of the spirit of deflationism. Deflationists routinely deride compositional principles like (1) as trivial (Field, 2005, p. 24) and of "no interest in their own right" (Field, 1994, p. 269) . In fact, however, such principles, taken together, have significant logical strength, independent of the extension of the induction axioms, and for reasons that are closely connected with the sort of consistency proof on which the conservativeness argument was originally based.
In the remainder of this paper, the results to which I have just alluded will be stated precisely and, in some cases, proved. 4 In Section 1, I shall present the background material from logic that is necessary for the rest of the discussion. In Section 2, I shall present a first form of the results. In Section 3, we shall encounter two natural worries about the significance of those results. In Section 4, I will present the results in a different form, one that should assuage such concerns. There is a different worry about that form of the results, however, which we shall discuss in Section 5. I shall close, in Section 6, by returning to the philosophical issues we have just been discussing and explaining how I think the technical results presented bear upon them.
Preliminaries
In an effort to make what follows as widely accessible as possible, I will first present a brief overview of the machinery from logic that we will be using.
The theories we will be discussing will all be recursively axiomatized. And since we will be discussing consistency statements, we need, for reasons famously made clear by Feferman (1960) , to think of theories intensionally: not as sets of theorems, nor even as sets of axioms, but as particular presentations of sets of axioms. Officially, we identify a theory with a formula that is true of (the Gödel numbers of) its axioms. Where we are dealing with finitely axiomatized theories, we shall assume that their axioms as presented in the simplest possible way: as a list or, if you prefer, a disjunction.
A theory is 'stated in' a language. The languages in which we'll be interested here are first-order languages, constructed from terms, function-symbols, and predicate-letters in the usual way. These languages are assumed to be finite, in the sense that they have only finitely 4 Results not proven here are proven in a companion paper (Heck, 2015) . many atomic expressions. It is convenient to identify a language with the set of its atomic expressions, together with some indication of their logical type, that is, with what is sometimes called the 'signature' of the language.
Interpretatability
There are a number of ways of comparing the logical strength of theories. If the theories are stated in the same language, then the obvious question is whether one proves all the results the other proves. Comparison is more difficult when the theories are stated in different languages. In that case, the theories will trivially prove different theorems: If A is in the language of the one but not the other, then A ∨ ¬A will be a theorem of the one but not of the other.
If the language of one theory contains that of the other, then one way to compare them is to ask if the first is a 'conservative extension' of the second, that is, whether the theory in the extended language proves any new theorems that can be stated in the original language. 5 But even this fails if the theories are not so related. In that case, the established method of comparison uses the notion of interpretation, which was first explored in a systematic way by , although the basic idea is much older.
Let theories B (for 'base') and T (for 'target') be given, stated in languages L B and L T , respectively. A relative interpretation 6 of T in B consists of two parts: a translation of L T into L B , and proofs in B of the translations of the axioms of T . The translation is compositional, in the sense that the only thing we actually need to do is define the (non-logical) atomic expressions of L T in terms of those of L B and to specify a 'domain' for the interpretation in terms of a formula δ(x) of L B . This can then be extended to a complete translation of L T into L B in the obvious way, where quantifiers are 'relativized' to δ(x): ∀x(φ(x)) is translated as: ∀x(δ(x) → φ * (x)), where φ * (x) translates φ(x); ∃x(φ(x)), as: ∃x(δ(x) ∧ φ * (x)). 7 5 Strictly, T conservatively extends T if (i) whenever T A, then T A, and (ii) whenever T A and A is in the language of T , then T A. 6 In fact, there are several different notions of interpretation. We shall only need this one.
7 As well as proofs of the translations of the axioms, we also need proofs of δ(t * ), for each atomic term t of LT , and of the closure condition
Note that interpretability is transitive and reflexive. If T is relatively interpretable in B, then it follows that, if B is consistent, so is T . If a contradiction could be derived from the axioms of T , that proof could be mimicked in B: Just prove the translations of the axioms of T used in the proof of the contradiction, then append a modified version of the proof given in T . Indeed, quite generally, if T A, then B A * , where, again, the asterisk means: translation of. Moreover, if B and T are not too terribly weak, 8 then all of this will be provable in B and T themselves. So, in particular, T will prove Con(B) → Con(T ) and so, by the second incompleteness theorem, cannot prove Con(B). 9 By contrast, B perfectly well could prove Con(T ).
One way to give content to the idea that B is at least as strong as T is therefore to take it to mean: T is relatively interpretable in B. That this is a useful way to make the intuitive idea of relative strength rigorous emerged only after a good deal of hard work, beginning with Tarski, Mostowski, and Robinson (1953) and continuing through work by Feferman (1960) to the present day. And, while the notion of interpretation is particularly useful when we are dealing with theories stated in different languages, we can still ask whether T can be interpreted in B even when L T and L B are the same: The interpretation of the atomic vocabulary does not have to be the identity function. So the notion is very general, and it links up nicely with what we know about the strength of theories from the second incompleteness theorem. Now, a couple definitions that apply (sensibly) only to non-finitely axiomatized theories.
Definition. T is locally interpretable in B if every finite subset of T is intepretable in B.
Local interpretability obviously follows from 'global' interpretability, but not conversely. Local interpretability is also transitive and reflexive, and for each primitive function-symbol f , of however many places. We also need (if this isn't already covered) a proof that the domain is non-empty: ∃xδ(x). It is also convenient to allow terms and function-symbols to be translated using descriptions, which can then be eliminated as Russell taught. In that case, we need B to prove that the descriptions are proper.
8 Facts concerning interpretability can generally be verified in the theory known as I∆0 + Ω1, which is itself interpretable in Q. Note that any theory this strong will be subject to the second incompleteness theorem (Wilkie and Paris, 1987) .
9 As Feferman (1960, Theorem 5.9 ) famously showed, if B is reflexive, in the sense to be mentioned shortly, then there are ways B of specifying the same set of axioms so that B will prove Con(B ). We will ignore this complication here, however, and assume that all our theories are specified in 'nice' ways. it relates to relative consistency just as global interpretability does: If T is locally interpretable in B, then T is consistent if B is. The reason is that any proof of a contradiction in T will use only finitely many of T 's axioms.
Definition. T is reflexive if T proves the consistency of each of its finite sub-theories. I.e., for each finite U ⊆T , T Con(U).
A theory's being reflexive can cause all sorts of unexpected phenomena as regards the interpretability of other theories in it (Feferman, 1960) . What will matter most to us here is the fact that reflexive theories collapse the distinction between local and global interpretability. 10
Theorem (Orey's Compactness Theorem). Suppose that T is locally intepretable in B and that B is reflexive. Then T is globally interpretable in B.
Since PA is reflexive (Mostowski, 1952) , then, we can expect PA to be something of a special case. Which, indeed, we shall see that it is.
Fragments of Arithmetic
We shall mostly be concerned here with PA and certain of its sub-theories.
Robinson arithmetic, or Q, is the theory whose axioms are the universal closures of the following eight formulae:
10 The proof of this result was first published by Feferman (1960, Theorem 6.9 ).
The last is often considered a definition of <; it is convenient in the present context to regard < as just part of the language. The language of Q, {0, S, +, ×, <}, is what we shall call 'the language of arithmetic' and denote: A.
A formula is said to be ∆ 0 if all quantifiers contained in it are 'bounded', that is, if all of its quantified subformulae are of the form ∀x(x < t → · · · ) or ∃x(x < t ∧ · · · ), where t is a term. 11 A formula is Σ 1 (resp., Π 1 ) if it is of the form ∃x 1 . . . ∃x n (φ) (resp., ∀x 1 . . . ∀x n (φ)), where φ is ∆ 0 . A formula is Σ n (resp., Π n ) if it is ∃x 1 . . . ∃x n (φ) (resp., ∀x 1 . . . ∀x n (φ)), where φ is Π n−1 (resp., Σ n−1 ). A formula A is Σ n in a theory T if T proves A ≡ φ, for some Σ n formula φ, and similarly for other notions.
An important class of sub-theories of PA is characterized in terms of the induction axioms these theories permit. PA itself is Q plus the full induction scheme:
where A(x) is any formula at all. 12 The theory IΘ is Q plus induction for formulae in the set Θ: So A(x) has to be in Θ. Thus, I∆ 0 is Q plus induction for ∆ 0 formulae; IΣ 1 is Q plus induction for Σ 1 formulae; IΣ n is Q plus induction for Σ n formulae. Note that IΣ n , though not finitely axiomatized, as I have described it, is finitely axiomatizable (Hájek and Pudlák, 1993, pp. 77ff) . We shall assume a finite axiomatization. It is not known whether I∆ 0 is finitely axiomatizable.
I∆ 0 is in one sense clearly stronger than Q: It proves lots of important generalizations about the natural numbers that Q does not, such as x = Sx. But in another sense I∆ 0 is still very weak: It is interpretable in Q. 13 Another respect in which I∆ 0 is weak is that, although one can define the relation y = 2 x by means of a ∆ 0 formula exp(x, y), we cannot prove in I∆ 0 that exponentiation is total: ∀x∃y(exp(x, y)). The obvious proof uses induction on ∃y(exp(x, y)), which is Σ 1 . But for that very reason, the totality of exponentiation is provable in IΣ 1 , as is the totality of every other primitive recursive function. So IΣ 1 is much stronger than I∆ 0 : Indeed, IΣ 1 proves Con(I∆ 0 ).
The Logical Strength of Compositional Principles
In this section, I shall present and discuss the technical results to which I alluded at the end of the introduction. First, we need to talk about exactly what a theory of truth is.
Theories of Truth
Since the semantic axioms for the quantifiers, as Tarski formulated them, make use of sequences of elements from the domain, we shall need a nice theory of sequences if we're to formalize theories of truth. Technically, we'll need our base theory to be sequential, 14 which essentially means that it can code (and decode) finite sequences of its elements. Q is not sequential, but there are lots of sequential theories that are interpretable in Q. For example, I∆ 0 is sequential, and it is interpretable in Q. We can also just add a simple theory of sequences to Q to get a new theory, which we might call Q seq , which is also interpretable in Q and is sequential by construction. We'll assume something like that done. A compositional theory of truth consists of Tarski-style axioms for the logical and non-logical vocabulary. The axioms for the logical part of the language will always be the same:
And similarly for the other logical constants. Here, 'val(σ, i)' means: the value that σ assigns to the i th variable; 15 'Den σ (t, x)' means: t denotes x with respect to the sequence σ; 'Sat σ (A)' means: σ satisfies A; and 'τ i ∼ σ'
14 Visser (2009) gives lots of information about sequentiality. 15 What we would normally have, in the language of arithmetic, is a formula val(x, y, z) meaning "z is the value x assigns to the y th variable", rather than a functional expression as in the text. But these complications affect nothing that follows and clutter the exposition, so I shall ignore them.
means that τ and σ agree on what they assign to each variable, with the possible exception of v i , i.e.:
where lh(σ) is the length of the sequence σ.
In the case of the language of arithmetic, we'll also have these axioms for the non-logical constants:
The pattern should be clear. 16 Finally, then, we need to define the notion of truth itself:
That is Tarski's definition.
So that is what a theory of truth is. Now for some notation.
Definition. Let T be sequential. Then:
is T plus all T-sentences for the language of T .
DS
is the result of adding not just the T-sentences for the language of T but also the Sat-sentences, such as:
is the theory that extends T by adding the truth-theoretic axioms just described for the logical and non-logical vocabulary of the language of T .
Here, 'DT' stands for: disquotational truth; 'DS' for: disquotational satisfaction; 'CT', for: compositional truth.
Note that none of these theories extends any induction scheme that might be present in T . There is no real chance, then, that even CT − [T ] is going to prove the consistency of T . One might therefore suspect that CT − [T ] would logically be no stronger than T . If so, then, as we shall see, one would suspect wrongly, at least in general.
We shall also be interested in theories that do extend the induction scheme.
Definition. Suppose that T is among I∆ 0 , IΣ n , and so forth. Then:
except that it extends the induction scheme to permit semantic vocabulary.
DS[T ] is like DS
− [T ] except that it extends the induction scheme.
CT[T ]
is the result of adding a fully compositional truth-theory and extending the induction scheme.
To be frank, it is not at all obvious, in general, what it means to 'extend the induction scheme'. But in the cases in which we shall be interested, it is obvious enough: One simply treats the semantic vocabulary as being among the primitives of the language. 17 So, e.g., ∃x(Den σ (t, x)) counts as Σ 1 , and ∀x∃σ(Den σ (t, x)) counts as Π 2 .
Induction versus the Compositional Principles
We are now ready to state, and in some cases prove, the results I have been promising. We'll begin by exploring the various disquotational theories.
As noted earlier, DT[PA] is a conservative extension of PA. Here are some similar results, but stated in terms of interpretability. 18 Theorem 2.1.
Proof. Let S be a finite subset of the axioms of DT − [T ]. S will contain at most finitely many T-sentences, say for A 1 , . . . , A n . We interpret T(x) in terms of a 'list-like' theory of truth, that is, as:
With T(x) so defined, T will prove the T-sentences for A 1 , . . . , A n . For example, the translation of the T-sentence for A 1 is:
But the first conjunct of the first disjunct is provable, and the first conjunct of the other disjuncts is refutable. So this is provably equivalent to : A 1 ≡ A 1 , and so is itself provable.
This result extends smoothly to the case of satisfaction.
Theorem 2.2. DS − [T ] is locally interpretable in T .
Proof. Essentially the same proof works as in the case of Theorem 2.1.
To interpret the Sat-sentences for
Then the translation of the Sat-sentence for A 1 (v 1 , v 2 ) is:
which is again provable.
Theorem 2.3. DT[PA] is interpretable in PA, and so is DS[PA].
Proof. We'll prove the more inclusive case. Let S be a finite subset of the axioms of DS [PA] . S will contain at most finitely many Sat-sentences. We interpret Sat σ (x) as in the previous proof. So those Sat-sentences are all provable. But S may also contain some extended induction axioms. However, under our definition of Sat σ (x) , those induction axioms simply become induction axioms of PA.
The proof of Theorem 2.3 does not extend to sub-systems of PA such as IΣ 1 . The reason is that the A i may be of any complexity, and so, if we have an induction axiom for some Σ 1 formula A(x) containing semantic vocabulary, the result of replacing T(x) or Sat σ (x) by its 'listlike' definition in A(x) may yield a formula that is not itself Σ 1 . But there is a slightly more complicated proof that does work in the case of truth.
Proof. Let S be a finite subset of the axioms of DT[IΣ n ]. Then S contains only finitely many T-sentences. For illustration, say these are for A and B. As before, we interpret T(x) as:
. We can then easily prove the T-sentences for A and B. But, of course, S may also contain some extended induction axioms from DT[IΣ n ]. We need to see that these are also going to be provable.
Suppose one of these induction axioms is the axiom for the formula φ(x) ∨ T(sb( ψ(x) , x)), where φ(x) is Σ n but ψ(x) need not be. Here, sb(y, x) means: The result of substituting the numeral for x for the sole free variable in y. I choose this example because the threat is that the ability to substitute in this way will allow us to get the induction axiom for φ(x) ∨ ψ(x), which need not be Σ n . But, in fact, the threat is idle, because the induction axiom for the mentioned formula
can be proven under our interpretation of T(x). I am claiming, that is, that we can prove:
(Sorry about that.) The crucial point is that A and B are sentences, so the quantifier ∀x cannot bind any variables in A or B . Hence, they can be "pulled out" in the following way.
Abbreviate (2.1) as Φ(A, B). Then it is logically equivalent to:
where is 0 = 0 and ⊥ is 0 = 0. By completeness, this equivalence is provable. Now Φ( , ) is:
and that is the induction axiom for the formula
which is Σ n . So Φ( , ) is provable, and hence so is A∧B → Φ( , ). The same goes for the other cases. So (2.2) is provable; so (2.1) is provable. Nothing hinges on the details of this particular example.
We thus see that, for theories T in the usual arithmetical hierarchy-Q, I∆ 0 , IΣ n , PA-the deflationary theory DT[T ] is always locally interpretable in T .
The situation with compositional truth-theories is different.
Theorem 2.5. Suppose T ⊇ Q is sequential and finitely axiomatized.
It follows that, if T is finitely axiomatized, then CT − [T ] is logically stronger than T . This is a consequence of a beautiful form of the second incompleteness theorem due to Pudlák. Theorem 2.6 (Pudlák 1985, Corollary 3.5 ). Suppose T is finitely axiomatized, sequential, and consistent. Then T does not interpret Q + Con(T ).
The original form of the second incompleteness theorem says merely that T does not prove Con(T ). Building on earlier work by Feferman (1960, Theorem 6.5) , however, Pudlák improves on Gödel by showing that T cannot even interpret T + Con(T ), or even Q + Con(T ). So, we have: Corollary 2.7. Suppose T ⊇ Q is sequential and finitely axiomatized.
, so would IΣ n , contradicting Theorem 2.6-on the assumption, of course, that IΣ n is consistent.
The key result here is obviously Theorem 2.5. The proof of it turns out to be quite messy and so is presented elsewhere (Heck, 2015, §3.2) . 19 But certain features of the proof will be important below, and the basic idea behind it is easy enough to explain. As said above, there is no real hope that CT − [T ] will prove Con(T ), since whatever the induction axioms might be present in T have not been extended. But it turns out that we can get very close.
One argument for Con(T ) would proceed as follows.
Call a proof good if all of its lines are true. Proofs with 0 lines are trivially good. So suppose that n lines proofs are good, and consider some n + 1 line proof. If the last line is an axiom, then it is true, since all T 's axioms are true and all the logical axioms are true, too. If it is not an axiom, then it must follow by one of the rules of inference from some of the earlier lines. But those lines are true, by the induction hypothesis, and the rules of inference preserve truth, so the last line is again true. Hence, by induction, n lines proofs are good, for all n; hence all proofs are good; hence, all proofs have true conclusions. Since there is a sentence that is not true, namely 0 = 1, it cannot be a theorem of T , and so T is consistent.
The emphasized use of induction is unavailable in CT − [T ], but the rest of the proof turns out to be perfectly fine. Proving that it's fine is what gets messy, for reasons connected with such logical principles as universal instantiation. But, if T is finitely axiomatized, then we can indeed show in CT − [T ] that:
(ii) If n line T -proofs are good, then n + 1 line T -proofs are good.
The formula expressing "n line T -proofs are good" is thus what Russell called 'inductive'. Quite general techniques, known as 'shortening of cuts', 20 can then be used to show that CT − [T ] interprets Q plus the statement "∀n(n line T -proofs are good)". And from that it follows that
One thing about this argument that it is important to appreciate is that it is absolutely essential that we be able to prove that all of T 's axioms are true. If we do not know that all of T 's axioms are true, but only know, of each of them, that it is true, then we cannot even prove that all one-line proofs are good. The best way to think of this is to see Theorem 2.5 as a consequence of: 21 Theorem 2.8. Let U be any theory in the language of arithmetic. Then
Here, T(U) is the formalization of: all axioms of U are true.
Proposition 2.9. If T is finitely axiomatized, then
The action, unsurprisingly, is in the proof of Theorem 2.8. Proposition 2.9 is fairly trivial. Indeed, it is easy to see that DT − [T ] already proves that all axioms of T are true, if T is finitely axiomatized.
Proposition 2.10. For each axiom
Proof. Let A be an axiom of T and so of DT
Proposition 2.11. If T is finitely axiomatized, then DT − [T ] proves T(T ).
Proof. Let the axioms of T be A 1 , . . . A n . Then by Proposition 2.10,
Proposition 2.9 now follows from the fact that
20 This technique is originally due to Solovay. Burgess (2005, §2. 2) gives an accessible treatment. A more complete treatment in presented Hájek and Pudlák (1993, pp. 366ff) . The basic idea is that, if A(x) is inductive in some theory U-i.e., if U A(0) and U A(x) → A(Sx)-then, from U's point of view, the natural numbers might as well just be the numbers that satisfy A(x). Unsurprisingly, that isn't quite right, but the details can be made to work. 21 Note that, if T is infinitely axiomatized, we will have to choose some specification of its axioms, both in order to formalize "all axioms of T are true" and to formalize Con(T ). In Theorem 2.8, then, we are using the same specification both times. 22 This will also be true in many cases when T is just finitely axiomatizable. It's an interesting exercise to prove this. But we'll officially stick to the case of theories that are actually finitely axiomatized.
Lemma 2.12. For each formula
proves the corresponding Sat-sentence:
Proof. A rigorous proof would be by induction on the complexity of sentences of L. But this should be fairly obvious. 23 A little experimentation will reveal that proofs of T-sentences need no more than is available in Q seq : We're not proving any general laws, just a bunch of particular facts, and Q is very good at proving particular facts.
The crucial thing to note here is the contrast between Proposition 2.9 and Proposition 2.10. If T is not finitely axiomatizable, then there is no reason whatsoever to suspect that CT − [T ] will prove that all axioms of T are true, although it does prove that each axiom of T is true.
To summarize, then: DT[IΣ n ] is locally interpretable in IΣ n , and so in that sense is no stronger than IΣ n ; but
is at best only very slightly stronger than IΣ n , 25 whereas CT − [IΣ n ] is at least as strong as Q + Con(IΣ n ), which is the theory that Pudlák's version of the second incompleteness theorem tells us must be stronger than IΣ n . So CT − [IΣ n ] is signficantly stronger than DT[IΣ n ].
Objections (I)
The moral of the last section is meant to be this: Whereas deflationary truth-theories are logically very weak, whether or not induction is extended, compositional truth-theories have significant logical strength, even when induction is not extended. So, as I suggested earlier, there is no symmetry between the compositional axioms and the extension of induction. If we want to 'blame' one or the other for the non-conservativity result discussed earier, then, we should blame the compositional axioms. There are, however, two sorts of objections that might be made to the interpretation of the mathematical facts that I have just suggested. 23 Leigh and Nicolai (2013 
Theories of Satisfaction
The first objection is that matters look different if we consider satisfaction instead of truth.
We Proof. Let A(v 0 , v 1 ) be a formula of the language of arithmetic. We want to show that we can prove the induction axiom for it. (Extension to the case of extra free variables is straightforward.) Consider the formula:
But the Sat-sentence for A(x, y) is: 29
26 This result is relevant to Halbach's claim that the 'uniform disquotation scheme'-our DS[·]-is plausibly analytic, since DS[PA] is a conservative extension of PA (Halbach, 2001a, §2) . What we have just seen is that this result depends crucially upon the choice of PA as base theory. Whether one takes conservativity to be required for analyticity or regards it as merely indicative of it, the uniform disquotation scheme appears to be logically quite strong, transforming IΣ1 into a theory containing PA. It is only in very special cases that it gives us nothing we did not already have. 27 This result can surely be improved by bounding the quantifier ∃τ in the first displayed formula in the proof. It is not clear to me just how good the bound can be made to be, however-that will depend upon exactly how we code sequences-so I am not sure whether we can show that DS[I∆0] contains PA. But it seems almost certain that DS[I∆0 + Ω1] contains PA.
28 The crucial point here is that, except for Sat, everything here is primitive recursive and so is ∆1 in IΣ1.
29 This is where an attempt to use truth and substitution to prove a similar result would break down. Let num(x) be the numeral for x. Then we can certainly consider the So φ(z, σ) is provably equivalent in DS[IΣ 1 ] to: 30 A(z, val(σ, 1)) Hence, (3.1) reduces to:
And this holds for any sequence σ. But, for any given v 1 , there is a sequence σ such that val(σ, 1) = v 1 . Hence, for this σ, we have: 1) ), for any v 0 . So (3.2) becomes:
And that is the induction axiom for A(v 0 , v 1 ).
One might therefore suggest that it is not the compositional nature of CT − [T ] that gives it its strength, but its play with the notion of satisfaction.
It goes some way towards answering this objection to note that the extension of induction here is essential. It remains the case that, if we do not extend induction, then, as Theorem 2.2 shows, we get only a marginal increase in logical strength if we add the Sat-sentences, 31 but we get a significant increase in logical strength if we add a compositional truth-theory. So the asymmetry to which I have pointed remains. But it would be nice to have a bit more to say.
formula:
T( A(num(z), num(v1)) ) and the induction axiom for it will be available in DT[IΣ1]. But there is no T-sentence for T( A(num(z), num(v1)) ), with variable z and v1. There are only T-sentences for the various instances of this formula, and we can use only finitely many of them at a time. 30 By the following calculation:
The last step uses the fact that, since τ 0 ∼ σ, val(σ, 1) = val(τ, 1). 31 Visser has observed that DS − [T ] is never globally interpretable in T , if T is finitely axiomatized. Even the Sat-sentences by themselves, then, are not logically trivial.
Finite Axiomatizability
The second worry concerns the fact that Corollary 2.7 does not apply to PA, as the following shows. 32 Theorem 3.2 (Enayat and Visser, 2015, Theorem 5.1) .
The worry here is not just that Corollary 2.7 applies only to finitely axiomatized theories (though one might pursue that point as well). The worry concerns what Theorem 3.2 shows about why 'adding a truth-theory' adds logical strength. It is true that
is not stronger than PA, maybe we should conclude that adding a truth-theory adds logical strength only in so far as we pretend not to believe something we ought to believe, namely: full induction. Or, to put it diferently: Perhaps the reason CT − [IΣ n ] is stronger than IΣ n is because the syntax on which we are building these theories is artificially weak. 33
Towards a Response
Somewhat surprisingly, it turns out that these two objections have a common source: a conflation, common in contemporary work on theories of truth, between the object theory about which we propose to reason and the syntactic theory in which we propose to reason about that object theory.
As we have seen, CT − [T ] is not going to be able to prove the consistency of T : It lacks the necessary induction axioms. If we do want to investigate theories in which the consistency of T can be proven semantically, then, we need to consider theories in which the induction axioms have been extended. Here, then, are some obvious questions about such theories: How much induction do we need to prove the consistency of Q? How much do we need to prove the consistency of IΣ n ? or of PA? Is it always the same amount? Or does it vary with the object theory?
Careful analysis of the structure of semantic consistency proofs shows that the answer is that we always need the same amount of induction:
32 Note that it follows from Theorem 3.2 that CT − [PA] does not prove that all axioms of PA are true. 33 An objection along these lines was communicated to me by Burgess, whose student Noel Swanson had made it in response to an earlier manuscript of mine that covered much of the material we are discussing (Heck, 2009 ). Thanks to both of them for the objection.
We need it for certain Σ 1 formulae involving semantic vocabulary. More precisely: 34 The second of these results implies that CT[IΣ 1 ] proves Con(IΣ 1 ) and that CT[IΣ n ] proves Con(IΣ n ). But we do not have any way, if we speak only in the terms in which Corollary 3.4 is formulated, to express the insight that the only induction we need to prove Con(IΣ n ) is already available in CT[IΣ 1 ]. The problem is that the 'base theory' is playing two roles. On the one hand, through the magic of Gödel numbering, it is our theory of syntax. On the other hand, it is the object theory, and in that role it is what allows us to prove the basis of the induction: that all the axioms of T are true.
The formulation in Theorem 3.3, which is ultimately more fundamental, goes some way towards pulling these two roles apart: The 'base theory' T is now providing our theory of syntax, and the formalization of "all axioms of U are true" is providing the basis for the induction; thus, U is the object theory. And so, the thought might be, CT[IΣ 1 ] + T(IΣ 2 ) will prove Con(IΣ 2 ), and CT[IΣ 1 ] + T(IΣ 3 ) will prove Con(IΣ 3 ), and so forth; the constant presence of CT[IΣ 1 ] now expresses the fact that we only need a limited amount of induction for the argument, no matter what the object theory may be.
In fact, however, the syntax, with its extended induction axioms, can still 'infect' the object theory. We have already seen in and so also proves Con(IΣ n ), for each n. So, yes,
34 Something like this result has presumably been known for some time, though I do not know of any previous statement of the result in this sort of form: as applied to axiomatic theories of truth. I present a detailed proof elsewhere (Heck, 2015, §3.4) . It may be that this result is not best possible and that it can be strengthened to T ⊇ I∆0. It is unclear, however, whether that is true, for reasons I discuss in the paper just cited.
Note that the remarks made in footnote 21 apply here, too.
for each n, which implies that And now we can see quite clearly that Theorem 3.3 does not really help us to disentangle the different roles being played by the syntactic theory and by the object theory.
If we are going to resolve these problems and get a proper formulation of the insight expressed when we say that only Σ 1 induction is needed for semantic consistency proofs, then what we need to do is explicitly to disentangle the syntactic theory from the object theory: We need to find a way to allow ourselves to vary the syntactic theory we use when we talk about the object theory without thereby changing what object theory we are talking about. We'll explore how we might do so in the next section. Once we have done so, however, the first objection will have been answered, since, as will then be clear, results like Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.6 depend essentially upon the entanglement.
Concerning the second objection, the first thing to note it that is not the presence of full induction that is driving the proof that CT − [PA] is intepretable in PA. It is the reflexivity of PA, as the following more general results show. We first need the following partial converse of Theorem 2.5. 37 35 Of course, this is true only so long as U is a sub-theory of PA. In that respect, then, Theorem 3.3 can be used to 'pull apart' the roles played by the object theory and the base theory, so long as T is an arithmetical theory that PA does not already prove consistent. But that seriously limits the scope of the result, and Corollary 3.4 then has limited application, since there are no finitely axiomatizable extensions of PA in the same language.
36 Wang (1952, p. 260) credits Rosser with the observation that we do need to ask how CT[PA] manages to prove that all of PA's axioms are true, and not just that each of them is, and he gives the first detailed proof of that fact. I give a more modern presentation of this result elsewhere (Heck, 2015, §3.4) . 37 It is, at present, unclear whether this result can be strengthed to give us a proper converse of Theorem 2.5. It would be really nice if it could, since we could then conclude 
Proof. Every finite fragment of CT
, which is of course a subset of IΣ 1 + {Con(U)}.
Proof. Since T is reflexive, it proves Con(U), for each finite U ⊇ T . So
. It then follows from Orey's Compactness Theorem that T globally interprets
Theorem 3.2 then follows from Theorem 3.9, since PA is reflexive. There are plenty of theories that do not have full induction but are nonetheless reflexive. 38 For example, the following sort of construction allows us to build a reflexive theory from any theory with which we wish to begin:
Now let the 'reflexive closure' of U, RCl(U), be ∪T n . RCl(U) is reflexive, since every finite sub-theory of RCl(U) is contained in one of the T n , and T n+1 proves Con(T n ) by construction. So, in particular, we have from Theorem 3.9:
was mutually interpretable with Q + Con(T ). As we shall see below, though, we do get this result in the disentangled setting.
38 One well-known such theory is Primitive Recursive Arithmetic, but its language is not finite, and it is not clear how the results proven here apply to such theories.
That, however, does not look like a result that should call into question the philosophical conclusions drawn from the discussion in Section 2.
Really to answer the second objection, however, we need to understand exactly what role the reflexivity of the base theory is playing in the proof of Theorem 3.9. As we shall see, it is not the reflexivity of the syntactic theory that is responsible for this result, but the reflexivity of the object theory. In particular, the reason we get Theorem 3.2 is because we have taken PA as our object theory, not because we have taken PA as our syntactic theory. Indeed, once we have successfully disentangled the syntactic theory from the object theory, we will see that (the relevant analogues of) the results reported in Section 2 are largely insensitive to what syntactic theory we use.
Disentangling the Syntactic Theory From the Object Theory
Our goal now is to disentangle the syntactic theory from the object theory. Interestingly enough, we can do so simply by following what Tarski actually did in "The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages". Here is his explanation of what a meta-language adequate for his purposes must be like:
A meta-language. . . must contain three groups of expressions:
(1) expressions of a general logical kind; (2) expressions having the same meaning as all the constants of the language to be discussed. . . ; (3) expressions of the structural-descriptive type which denote single signs and expressions of the language considered, whole classes and sequences of such expressions or, finally, the relations existing between them. (Tarski, 1958, pp. 210-11) The expressions mentioned under (3) belong to syntax; those under (2), to the object language. Tarski does not quite say that these two classes are to be disjoint, but it is natural to read him that way, and that is plainly how he conceives the matter in his discussion of the calculus of classes (Tarski, 1958, §3) . Tarski was of course aware that syntax can be interpreted in arithmetic (at least after reading Gödel): His famous theorem on the indefinability of truth depends upon that fact. But the central purpose of "The Concept of Truth" is not 'limitative' but positive: Tarski's primary goal in that paper is to show that there is a consistent notion of truth that is adequate the meta-mathematical purposes for which truth was then already being deployed. Doing that simply does not require Gödel numbering or any similar technique. The idea of separating syntax from the object theory is thus old, even if the application I propose to make of it is somewhat new.
Let L be the object language: the language for which we want to give a truth-theory. Let S be a disjoint language in which to formalize syntax. The most natural choice for S would be the language of concatenation (Quine, 1946; Corcoran et al., 1974; Grzegorczyk, 2005) . But so as not to make things too unfamiliar, we may take S to be a copy of the language of arithmetic, written in a different font, perhaps. Our theory of syntax can then be taken be Q, or IΣ 1 , or whatever we wish.
To formulate a semantics for L, we of course need to be able to talk about the things L talks about. In particular, if we're going to have the usual Tarski-style clauses for the primitive expressions of L, we need to have the expressive resources of L available. So the obvious choice for the language of our semantic theory would be S ∪ L plus whatever semantic machinery we want, and that is what we shall use. Because of complications we need not consider, however, we shall regard the semantic theory as many-sorted. Variables ranging over the domain of S will be italic; those ranging over the domain of L will be upright.
We also need a theory of sequences or, better, of assignments of objects to variables: There is no hope of coding sequences of objects from the domain of L as objects in S, at least not in general. 39 The details of that theory do not matter here, either. What is important is that assignments live in a third sort. Variables ranging over them will be Greek letters. 40 A truth-theory for L will then be more or less the familiar one, with some adjustments to take account of the present framework. For example, these axioms will be common to all theories, independent of L:
39 Simply because L might be the language of set theory, and there are way too many sets to code even finite sequences of them as numbers. 40 The missing details are provided elsewhere (Heck, 2015, §4 .1).
The other axioms of the theory will depend upon what L is, and it could be anything. If L is the language of set theory, then the only other axiom will be:
In the case of the language of arithmetic, we'll have axioms like:
Note that the used expressions '∈', '0', and '+' are expressions of L, not of S.
As for notation: 41
Definition. Let T be an arithmetical theory. Then:
is the semantics for L we have just described.
•
with the induction axioms in T extended to permit semantic vocabulary and reference to assignments. 42 So the induction axioms of TT Our earlier results transfer smoothly to this framework, though often in improved forms, and there are new results available as well. I shall state most of these without proof. Many of the proofs are similar to ones already given; the rest are more complex than it makes sense to present here. Full proofs are presented elsewhere (Heck, 2015, §4) .
First, we get an analogue of Lemma 2.12.
Lemma 4.1. For each formula
41 There are again questions about what exactly it means to extend the induction scheme, in general. But we'll limit our attention to cases where it is clear what it means.
42 Because our theory is many sorted, quantifiers of any of the three types could now appear in the induction axioms. That leads to the question what exactly we mean by a Σn formula in the present setting. It turns out that we can ignore the differences between types of quantifiers for our purposes. Thus, e.g., ∃x(Denσ(t, x)) counts as Σ1 for our purposes, and ∀σ∃t∃x(Denσ(t, x)) counts as Π2.
But now the situation is improved: TT − L [Q] is as weak as it is possible for it to be. 43
Proof. Since no theory stated in L is so far in evidence, we can give L the completely trivial interpretation in a one-element domain. A semantic theory for L, so interpreted, is then easily constructed. 44 If we develop our truth-theory in the usual way, where syntax and the object theory are intertwined, then the weakest materially adequate truth-theory for the language of arithmetic is CT − [Q seq ], and it follows from Theorem 2.6 that CT − [Q seq ] is not interpretable in Q. As said, no object theory is yet in play here. To add one, we simply add it. Thus, for example, if T is a theory in L, then TT − L [Q] + T is a semantic theory for the language of L, with Q as the syntactic theory, plus the object theory T . Then we get the following analogues of our earlier results. Now, however, we can also prove a converse of Corollary 4.6:
Thus, we get a precise characterization of just how strong TT
43 This means, among other things, that there is a materially adequate, fully compositional theory of truth for the language of ZFC that is interpretable in Q.
44 If L contains no terms other than variables, then we may not be able to specify a one element domain via a formula δ(x) with just x free. In that case, we will have to use a parameter, which means that TT As said, then, compositional truth-theories have significant logical power, even when the syntax is as weak as possible, and even when we do not extend induction: If we start with a finitely axiomatized theory T and add an absolutely minimal but still compositional theory of truth for the language of T -and add it in a way that is guaranteed not to 'infect' T itself-then the result is a theory that is logically stronger than T in the sense that it is not interpretable in T .
Perhaps the nicest way to formulate this point is due to Visser: A compositional theory of truth is like an operator that 'upGödels' any finitely axiomatized theory you hand it. What is upGödeling? It's the operation that maps a finitely axiomatized theory T to the one that Pudlák's form of the second incompleteness theorem guarantees will always be stronger than it is: Q + Con(T ). And so, if you think of TT − L [Q] + (·) as an operator on theories, then what it does, when handed a finitely axiomatized theory T , is precisely to upGödel it: It hands you back a theory that is mutually interpretable with Q + Con(T ). So it is not just that TT − L [Q] + T is always stronger than T (when T is finitely axiomatized). It is stronger in the very specific, and very important, way that is revealed by the second incompleteness theorem.
Our specific interest here, however, is in the objection raised in 3.2: that Corollary 2.7 applies only to finitely axiomatized theories and does not apply to PA. I said in 3.3 that, once we had disentangled the syntax from the object theory, it would be possible to see that this is due not to PA's role as syntax, but to its role as object theory. We've done the disentangling now. Let's see what difference it has made. First, note that we do get the same phenomenon as before when PA is the object theory.
+ IΣ n , for some n, and so is interpretable in Q + Con(IΣ n ), by Theorem 4.7. But Q + Con(IΣ n ) is a sub-theory of PA, since PA is reflexive, so U is interpretable in PA.
That establishes local interpretability, and Orey's Compactness Theorem does the rest.
That is essentially the same as the proof of Theorem 3.9, and the proof can easily be extended to the case of reflexive theories generally. So, e.g., we also have:
By contrast, Theorem 4.7 extends smoothly to the case of PA as syntactic theory and, indeed, to any theory that contains Q. 45 Corollary 4.11. Let T be a finitely axiomatized theory in L, and suppose
Proof. We know from Theorem 4.7 that TT
Why does it make such a difference whether PA is our syntax or our object theory? The reason, ultimately, is pretty simple. The basic result is Theorem 4.5: TT One can see this from the fact that Proposition 4.9 continues to hold not just as the syntactic theory is strengthened. . .
Proposition 4.12.
45 If T is some finitely axiomatizable sub-theory of PA, then this is of course a boring result. There is no reason whatsoever to expect, say, TT − L [PA] + IΣ2 to be interpretable in IΣ2, and in fact PA is not interpretable in any of its finitely axomatizable sub-theories (Feferman, 1960, Theorem 6.8) . But of course T need not be a sub-theory of PA. It could, for example, be Q+Con(PA), and then Corollary 4.11 tells us that TT
It is one of the advantages of the present way of proceeding, however, that T need not even be formulated in the language of arithmetic. We know that ZF Con(PA). So let C be the finite set of axioms of ZF that are used in that proof. Since C Con(PA), it follows from results of Feferman's that C is not interpretable in PA. Yet it still follows from Corollary 4.11 that TT 
. . . but even when we add semantic induction: Proposition 4.13 (Heck, 2015, Corollary 4.18) .
And this is despite the fact that we have: Theorem 4.14 (Heck, 2015, Theorem 4.11) .
So the reason TT L [PA] + PA not only does not prove Con(PA) but cannot even interpret Q + Con(PA) is simply that it has no way to prove that all of PA's axioms are true, rather than just that each of them is. And the same goes for any other reflexive theory you wish to consider.
There's an odd irony to this situation. Deflationists frequently claim that the truth-predicate is a 'device of infinite conjunction': Its function, allegedly, is to allow us to formulate such generalizations as "All axioms of PA are true". But very little effort has been made to tell us precisely what that is supposed to mean: What exactly is the relationship between this generalization and the infinite conjunction of PA's axioms? The only serious attempt known to me to answer this question is due to Halbach (1999) , who shows that, in certain circumstances, adding such a generalization to a theory is exactly equivalent to adding all of its instances. What we have seen, however, is that, considered as additions to, say, TT L [IΣ 1 ], there is all the difference in the world between the axioms of PA and the generalization stating that all of them are true. The latter is a lot stronger than the former. 46 That's not to say, of course, that there's not some other way of explaining what it means to 'use the truth predicate merely as a device of generalization'. But I don't know what that would be.
That, then, addresses the objection raised in 3.2. The other objection, recall, was based upon the observation that DS[IΣ 1 ] contains PA. But that sort of result does not transfer to the present framework, as we shall now see.
Definition. Let U be an arithmetical theory, taken as our theory of syntax. Then: 47
• DDT L [U] is the theory of truth for the language of T that is similar to TT L [U] but, instead of containing a compositional theory of truth contains just the T-sentences for L-though it also extends the induction scheme to permit the presence of the truth-predicate.
• DDS L [U] is the theory of truth for the language of T that is similar to DDT L [U] but adds the Sat-sentences for L (and extends the induction scheme).
The sorts of results concerning disquotational theories of truth proven earlier transfer to the disentangled setting.
Proposition 4.15.
Proof. The proof of (i) is similar to that of Proposition 4.2. The proof of (ii) simply mimics that of Theorem 2.4. For (iii), DDT A [IΣ n ] + IΣ m is locally interpretable in IΣ n + IΣ m , where these two theories are formulated in disjoint copies of the language of arithmetic. But IΣ n + IΣ m will obviously be interpretable in IΣ max(m,n) .
So we also get an analogue of Theorem 2.3.
Corollary 4.16. DDT
Proof. Any finite fragment of this theory is contained in one or another of the DDT A [IΣ n ] + IΣ m . So each finite fragment is interpretable in IΣ n , for some n, and so is also interpretable in PA. That establishes local interpretability, and now we invoke Orey's Compactness Theorem.
Unfortunately, the sorts of techniques used in these proofs do not seem to allow us to prove that DDS L [IΣ n ] + T is locally interpretable in IΣ n + T , 48 Moreover, the kind of argument that was used to show that DS[IΣ 1 ] contains PA-or, more generally, to extract information about the object theory from the theory of truth-is simply unavailable in the disentangled setting. The reason is that the induction that is available in the syntactic theory is over syntactic objects: expressions. We can formalize proofs by induction on the complexity of expressions, and object-language expressions may occur in the induction axioms used in those proofs. But the converse is not true: The induction scheme (or other axiom scheme, such as separation) present in the object theory has not been extended, so it is difficult to see how the theory of truth could 'infect' the object theory.
In particular, if we look at the instance of induction on which the proof of Theorem 3.1 was based:
we see that, in the disentangled setting, it is not even well-formed. In the second line, for example, the variable v 0 that is bound by the universal quantifier must come from the syntactic language: It ranges over expressions. But val(τ, 0) , the value that τ assigns to the first variable, is in the domain of the object language. So val(τ, 0) = v 0 makes so sense, and the same is true of the second conjunct on every other line.
Admittedly, then, several issues remain concerning exactly what adding the Sat-sentences to a given theory, even in a disentangled way, gives us, in terms of logical strength, at least in the case when we extend induction. If we do not extend induction, then the same sorts of results as we had earlier are available in the disentangled setting, too. has no resources for doing so. We will be able to prove of each instance of modus ponens that is it valid, but not that all of them are.
Objections (II)
All of that said, there is another worry one might have about the framework we are now using.
As we have seen, if T is finitely axiomatized, then TT L [IΣ 1 ]+T proves Con(T ). It is important to understand, however, that the particular sentence Con(T ) that is being proved is a sentence of the syntactic language S: If our syntax were stated as a theory of concatenation, then the consistency statement would be formulated using concatenation and other syntactic notions defined in terms of it. Of course, in the sorts of cases in which we are primarily interested, there will also be a sentence of the object language L that expresses the claim T is consistent. (There will be many such sentences, in fact.) So we need to distinguish the sentence Con S (T ) of the syntactic language that I have said can be proven in TT L [IΣ 1 ] + T from the sentence Con L (T ) of the object language about which I have so far said nothing.
And, indeed, the object language sentence Con L (T ) cannot be proven in TT L [IΣ 1 ] + T . This follows from a much more general observation, due to Halbach, that even TT L [PA] + T is a conservative extension of T (Leigh and Nicolai, 2013, §3.2) . The thought, then, is that this shows that there is something unnatural about the framework that results from our disentangling the syntactic theory from the object theory. Recall, for example, the following quote from Field (1999, p. 536): . . . [T] he way in which we "learn more about the natural numbers by invoking truth" is that in having that notion we can rigorously formulate a more powerful arithmetical theory than we could rigorously formulate before. There is nothing very special about truth here: using any other notion not expressible in the original language we can get new instances of induction, and in many cases these lead to nonconservative extensions.
Disentangling the syntax from the object theory might have seemed like a good idea, but if we do so then we never get non-conservative extensions! Disentangling thus seems to cost us the ability to use truth to learn more about the natural numbers in the way we thought we could. So maybe we should reconsider.
I understand why one might have such a reaction. To be honest, when Halbach first mentioned his observation to me, I was both surprised and puzzled. On further reflection, however, it has come to seem to me that the situation here is exactly as it should be. There is nothing to stop us from using truth to learn more about arithmetic. The interesting questions are (i) what we need to add to TT L [IΣ 1 ] + T if we are to do so and (ii) why we should need to add it.
Halbach's original proof of his observation was a straightforward generalization of an earlier model-theoretic proof, due to Craig and Vaught (1958, p. 298, Lemma 2.7) , that TT ¬A] isn't inconsistent since, by Theorem 5.2, to be mentioned shortly, it is locally interpretable in PA + Con(T + ¬A), which is not just consistent but true.
The case of Con L (T ) is just a special case of this more general result. By the second incompleteness theorem, T + ¬Con L (T ) is consistent if T is, and it is finitely axiomatized if T is, as well. So it follows from Theorem 4.14 that
But now it is clear that it had better be Con S (T + ¬Con L (T )) that we are proving, and not
and so would be inconsistent. Which, again, it is not.
From a model-theoretic point of view, then, what is happening is that the only information we have about the structure of the L-related part of models of TT L [PA] + T is what is provided by the object theory T . The truth-theory for L-the TT L [PA] part-does not constrain the structure of the part of the model for the object language at all. In particular, there is nothing in the theory of truth that requires the domain of L to be in any way 'standard' or, to be more precise, to be standard relative to the syntax.
A model of TT L [PA] + T consists, more or less, of a model of PA, considered as our syntax, and a model of T , considered as our object theory, plus some semantic pieces that connect these two parts. It is easy to see that, if L is the language of arithmetic, then the domain of the syntactic language has to be isomorphic to an initial segment of the domain of the object language. This is because we can prove in TT L [PA] + T that every numeral denotes a number-a member of the domain of the object language-and because the numbers so denoted will be isomorphic to the numerals that denote them. 51 But the converse need not be true: We have no way to prove that every number is denoted by a numeral. So it is perfectly possible for the domain of the object language not to be an initial segment of that of the syntactic language. In particular, the model of the syntactic part of the theory could be standard, and the model of the arithmetical part could be non-standard. As a result, it is perfectly possible for Con S (T ) to be true in the model, even though Con L (T ) is false in the model. And that, it seems to me, is absolutely as it should be. A theory of truth for the language of arithmetic shouldn't tell us anything specific about the domain over which the object-language variables range. It should simply take the domain as given, much as it takes the interpretation of the primitives of the object language as given: '0' denotes 0, 51 Note that this will be true even if there are non-standard numerals.
whatever that is; '<' is true of <x, y> just in case x < y, whatever that means; and the variables range over, well, whatever it is they range over. When we do model theory, we do not take the interpretations of the primitives as given: We may take '0' to refer to ∅; we may take '<' to be true of <x, y> just in case some complicated condition obtains; and we may take the domain to be whatever we like, sets for the language of arithmetic or numbers for the language of set theory. But we are not doing model theory. We are doing semantics. 52 Similarly, a theory of truth for the language of arithmetic shouldn't, all by itself, allow us to prove that every number is denoted by a numeral, let alone allow us to prove new purely arithmetical theorems. The following is no doubt a plausible argument: 0 is denoted by a numeral; if n is denoted by a numeral, then n + 1 is denoted by a numeral; so every number is denoted by a numeral. But to make this argument, we need to use 'extended' induction over the natural numbers, which is something to which we were not previously committed and to which we cannot be committed simply because we have decided to theorize semantically about the language of arithmetic. To put the point more generally: The mere fact that we have a theory of truth for some language L cannot, all by itself, force us to accept new principles concerning whatever it is that L talks about, that is, to add new axioms to whatever theory stated in L we might antecedently have accepted. In that sense, then, Field is absolutely right: The way we can use truth to learn more about the natural numbers is indeed to use it to "formulate a more powerful arithmetical theory" (Field, 1999, p. 536, my emphasis) . And that is something we can do if we wish: If we want, we can extend whatever induction axioms we accept to permit semantic vocabulary. My point, again, is simply that we cannot be committed to doing so simply because we have a theory of truth for the language of arithmetic, even a fully compositional one. That theory is a semantic theory, one about expressions and truth. It is not, in its own right, an arithmetical theory, one about numbers, and simply having it cannot force us to accept new instances of induction.
Does that mean that Field wins? No, because, once the syntax has been disentangled from the object theory, it becomes clear that the issue should never have concerned conservativity over the object theory. 53 Surely one would not expect our theory about the language we use to talk about physical reality, say, to entail new substantive facts about physical reality when added to whatever physical theory we happen to accept. And the same is true for arithmetic and the language we use to talk about it. Everyone, deflationist or otherwise, should therefore agree that a semantics for the language we use to talk about some subject matter should be conservative over our theory of that subject matter. 54 The right question to ask is therefore not whether a semantic theory for a given language L is conservative over theories stated in L, but whether it is conservative over a purely syntactic theory for L. The right question is not what we can learn about numbers using the notion of truth but what we can learn about expressions using the notion of truth.
With that change, however, the entire dialectic that has surrounded the issue of conservativity transfers smoothly. We can learn a lot about expressions if we have access to semantic notions. If we have a fully compositional theory of truth for a language L, for example, then we can use induction on the complexity of expressions to prove the consistency of any finitely axiomatized theory in L that we are prepared to accept and, more generally, to prove the consistency of any theory all of whose axioms we regard as true. The statement that a theory is (deductively) consistent is a purely syntactic statement. Semantics is therefore not conservative over syntax.
Of course, someone might respond:
. increase in strength? or is it the compositional principles? The answer to that question emerges from the mathematical facts summarized in Table 1 . Adding a compositional theory of truth for a language L to some finitely axiomatized theory stated in L adds significant logical strength, whether or not we extend the induction axioms, whereas adding a noncompositional theory adds little if any logical strength, even if we do extend the induction axioms. Now, to be sure, there is a special case: The case in which the object theory is itself a theory of syntax and the object language is the language of that very theory of syntax. In that case, one might think, we have no choice but to entangle syntax with the object theory, so that we collapse back into the more familiar framework used in Section 2, in which case the objections discussed in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 are restored. But, first of all, while this sort of case-in which self-reference is not only possible but natural-is important, it seems to me obvious that it is a special case. And even in this special case, it is still important to distinguish the role played by our theory of syntax qua theory of syntax from the role it plays qua object theory, for all the reasons given in 3.3. That is what disentangling allows us to do.
For some, the disentangled framework may still feel unnatural somehow. If so, then consider the fact that, if we do disentangle the syntactic theory from the object theory, we not only get improved results like the ones discussed in Section 4 but results like the following: Theorem 5.2 (Heck, 2015, §4.5 ). Suppose T is finitely axiomatized.
Then: (i)
For all n ≥ 1, TT L [IΣ n ] + T is mutually interpretable with IΣ n + Con(T ).
(ii) TT L [PA] + T is mutually locally interpretable with PA + Con(T ).
I for one trust mathematical elegance much more than I trust intuitive judgements about what seems natural, especially when those judgements have been shaped by decades of doing things one particular way. And the elegance of the results just mentioned, in my opinion, makes a very strong case for any framework that permits them to be formulated and proved.
Even in the special case in which our syntactic theory and our object theory are formulated in the same language, then, my response to the objections discussed in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 is the same: What is responsible for the phenomena on which they rest is the interaction of our syntactic theory with our object theory. We can allow these theories to interact if we like, but the familiarity of the usual setting that does not even distinguish them should not blind us to what we are doing. Even in this case, we can still distinguish between the two roles a single theory might play and investigate them formally, using the framework developed in Section 4. And we ought to distinguish those roles, too, since it is only if we do so that certain insights can be properly stated. Such facts do not lapse simply because we choose, for different reasons, to work in a setting in which the questions to which they are answers cannot even be formulated.
Closing
I began this paper by recalling the history of the debate over the conservativeness argument against deflationary theories of truth, and we have just had reason to recall that history again. Nonetheless, my purpose here has not been to revive that debate. My purpose, rather, has been to argue that compositional theories of truth are non-trivial, in the sense that they have significant logical strength. Although such theories can only be used to prove consistency when we extend the induction axioms, they allow us to interpret consistency statements even when we do not, and that is known to be logically significant.
For what it is worth, I do not myself take this result to show that Shapiro and Ketland were right and that Field was wrong. Shapiro and Ketland are to be applauded for trying to find some concrete content in the gnomic pronouncements some deflationists have made about truth's 'insubstantiality', but I tend to agree with Halbach (2001b, p. 188 ) that ". . . it is hard to see why the deflationist should be committed to conservativeness at all". Since it also seems hard to see why a deflationist should be committed to the logical vacuity of whatever truth-theoretic principles she might accept, 55 I do not take the results proven here to 'refute' deflationism. But they certainly do show that the compositional principles are not the trivialities they are often taken to be. 56 It thus becomes an important question what right deflationists have to such compositional principles and how they should understand the role the notion of truth plays in them. Those questions, however, are ones I will have to discuss elsewhere (Heck, 2014) . 57 55 Field (1999, p. 534) emphasizes that no deflationist has ever held that truth is 'expressively' insubstantial. 56 In my view (Heck, 2004, §4) , the T-sentences themselves are not trivialities, either, but for quite different reasons. 57 This paper is one of many to emerge from an earlier manuscript, "The Strength of Truth Theories" (Heck, 2009) , that ultimately became unmanageable. Thanks to Volker Halbach and Jeff Ketland for conversations early in the history of my work on this topic, and to Josh Schechter for conversations later on, that helped greatly. Comments on the earlier manscript from Cezary Cieśliński and Ali Enayat were also very helpful. Thanks also to two anonymous referees for their remarks.
Talks incorporating some of these ideas were given at a conference on philosophical logic, organized by Delia Graff Fara and held at Princeton University in April 2009; at the New England Logic and Language Colloquium and at the Philosophy of Mathematics Seminar at Oxford University, both in May 2011; and at a meeting of the Logic Group at the University of Connecticut, in April 2012. Thanks to everyone present for their questions and comments, especially J. C. Beall, John P. Burgess, Hartry Field, Daniel Isaacson, Graham Leigh, Carlo Nicolai, Charles Parsons, Agustín Rayo, and Lionel Shapiro, as well as Volker and Josh, again. Special thanks to my commentator at Princeton, Josh Dever, whose comments were insightful and lucid, as well as helpful.
I owe the greatest debt, however, to Albert Visser. Just as my ideas were starting to come together, discussions with Albert transformed the direction of this project. It was from him that I learned of Theorem 2.8 and its attendant corollaries, which led, of course, to the idea that we should focus on interpretability, not on conservativity, which is pretty much the central idea of this paper. Albert has also read many drafts along the way and provided extensive feedback. Obviously, he bears no responsibility for what I've done with the idea, and I'm not sure he'd agree with how I've developed it. Nonetheless, this paper would never have been written without Albert's assistance, for which I am extremely grateful.
